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IN THE SUPREME C0 URT
O,F THE STATE 0'F UTAH
1

PLC LANDSCAPE
CONSTRUCTION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
12607

PICCADILLY FISH 'N CHIPS, INC.
Defendant and Appellant.

APP'ELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant is the owner of a recently constructed
restaurant located at 1810 Washington Blvd. in Ogden.
Near the time of completion of construction of said
restaurant, defendant was contacted by plaintiff, a
landscaping company, regarding the possibility of
plaintiff providing the landscaping and exterior design
for the restaurant. Negotiations commenced between
the respective parties wherein various proposed designs and prices were discussed. The parties finally
agreed upon a specific plan and price and entered
into an oral agreement. At trial defendant contended
that the original agreement called for payment to
plaintiff of the sum of $4,581.30 with defendant furn-

1

ishing the services of the resident manager of the restaurant as general labor to assist in the landscaping.
Plaintiff maintained that the original agreement was for
payment of $4,581.30, but defendant was to provide
considerably more labor than could have been performed by the resident manager. During the course of
performance of the contract, various additions, deletions and modifications were made in the landscape
design, apparently under an agreement that the contract price would be later adjusted by mutual agreement. After the landscaping had been completed, the
respective parties met to adjust the contract price but
could not come to an understanding concerning either
the value of the extra work performed or the amount
of labor to have been provided by the defendant. The
defendant acknowledged that its restaurant manager
had not been available to work fulltime on the landscaping as previously planned and agreed to pay
plaintiff the reasonable value of his services during the
two-week period of performance of the agreement at
the rate of $50.00 per day. Defendant also agreed to
pay plaintiff for the contract modifications which defendant maintained had a reasonable value of approximately $400. Defendant thereafter paid the plaintiff the sum of $5,500 as full compensation for the
work performed. Plaintiff thereafter demanded payment of an additional $1, 169.53, alleging that the total
price of the work and materials furnished was
$6,669.53. Upon defendant's refusal to pay the additional $1, 169.53, plaintiff commenced an action to
recover that amount.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried in Ogden on the 24th day of
June, 1971, before the Honorable Calvin Gould, one
of the judges of the Second Judicial District. At the
conclusion of plaintiff's case, the court took under
advisement defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, said motion being based on the premise that
plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case. On
June 28, 1971, Judge Gould entered a Memorandum
Decision finding the issues in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant with judgment against the defendant in the sum of $1, 169.53 plus costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment entered
by the District Court and an order remanding the case
with direction that appellant's Motion for Summary
Judgment be granted with costs to the appellant.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
1.

The court erred in failing to grant defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment because plaintiff
failed to meet the required burden of proof.
A.

Plaintiff elected to proceed under the
theory of quantum meruit rather than express contract.

B.

Plaintiff's evidence failed to establish the
reasonable value of the materials and
labor provided.

3

ARGUMENT

I.

The court erred in failing to grant defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment because plaintiff failed to meet the required burden of proof.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
made when plaintiff rested its case was taken under
advisement and apparently the court never expressly
ruled on the Motion independent of the entire case as
nothing is stated concerning the Motion in the Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, or Judgment. Only the first 87 pages of the trial
transcript, comprising the plaintiff's entire case, need
be considered in determining the merits of defendant's Motion.
A.

Plaintiff elected to proceed under the
theory of quantum meruit rather than express contract.

Plaintiff's complaint does not allege the existence
of an express or implied contract with the defendant
wherein or whereby defendant agreed to pay either a
fixed price or fixed rate for work and materials supplied by plaintiff. The complaint merely states that
the "Plaintiff did work for the defendant in the amount
of Six Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Nine and 53/100
Dollars ($6,669.53) . . . . " 1 There is no allegation
that defendant agreed to pay that amount, only that
"Defendants refuse {sic} to pay the balance due on
1 Plaintiff's

Complaint, paragraph 2.

4

the open account and plaintiff
$1, 169.53 together with interest. 112

should

receive

In order to define and narrow the issues of fact
and theories of law involved in the case, this matter
went to pre-trial before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist on May 26, 1971. At the pre-trial hearing Judge
Wahlquist asked plaintiff's counsel to "Tell us your
theory and what evidence you have. 113 In response,
plaintiff's counsel outlined his case and then, in response, to the inquiry regarding the theory of recovery stated:
We are going ahead on the basis of the fact
that the work was in fact done and the reasonable value of the work would be the total
amount claimed. 4
The court then further inquired:
On a quantum merit [sic} or final bid type
agreement pact?

To which plaintiff's counsel finally replied:
. . . it's a quantum merit [sic} theory.

5

Plaintiff's counsel was then directed to prepare a pretrial order and to "state briefly in it this theory of your
116
action that you have outlined here.
2p1aintiff's Complaint, paragraph 3.
JReporter's Transcript of Proceedings in Pre-Tria.1, dated May 26, .1971,
before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, page 2, lines 4-5. (Hereinafter
cited merely as "Transcript of Pre-Trial Hearing")
4Transcript of Pre-Trial Hearing, page 2, lines 28-30.
5/d. page 3, lines 1, 10.
6/d. page 6, line 30 through page 7, line 1.
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Because the matter was not tried before Judge
Wahlquist who had presided at the pre-trial hearing
and because a written pre-trial order was not prepared, defendant's counsel in opening remarks indicated
to the trial judge that plaintiff had previously elected
and defined his theory of recovery as quantum meru it. 7
Plaintiff, therefore, having elected to proceed in
quantum meruit is bound by that theory and great injustice would result if the court then allowed recovery
on any other theory. In the case of Taylor v. E. M.
Royle Corporation, 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P2d 279
(1953), this Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Henriod, reversed a decision in the Fourth Judicial
District Court wherein the lower court granted relief
to a plaintiff on the theory of quantum meruit even
though plaintiff did not plead that theory either initially or by amendment. Justice Henriod explained:
. . . a defendant must be extended every
reasonable opportunity to prepare his case and
to meet an adversary's claims. Also he must be
protected against surprise and be assured
equal opportunity and facility to present and
prove counter contentions, else unilateral j~s
tice or injustice would result sufficient to raise
serious doubts as to constitutional due process
guarantees.

7Reporter's Transcript of Trial before Judge Calvin Gould, June. 2.~·
1971, page 3, lines 14-18. (Hereinafter cited merely as "Trial Transcript l
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1

"Here the record indicates that the plaintiff had
an express contract in mind, not one implied in
law. Plaintiff sought no change in theory by
way of pleading or proof. We believe an injustice would result if the rule were interpreted to
charge the defendant with liability under quantum merit [sic}, an issue he was never called
upon to meet. 8
If, therefore, the court is to allow plaintiff recovery in this case, or, more specifically, if the court is to
properly deny defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, it must do so on the basis that plaintiff presented
a prima facie case under the theory of quantum meruit.
It cannot be on the basis of an express contract.
The two vital elements comprising a prima facie
case in an action seeking recovery under the theory
of quantum meruit are proof of performance of the
services and the reasonable value thereof.
In an action of this character [quantum meruit} the vital elements which the plaintiff must
prove in order to establish a prima facie case
are the performance of services and the reasonable value thereof. 9
In order for defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment to have been properly denied, it must therefore
appear from the record that plaintiff established a
8264 P2d at 280.
9 Evans v. Mason, 308 P2d 245 (Ariz. 1957). See also, Wysowatchy
v. Lyons 137 Colo. 578 328 P2d 576 (1958); Manford v. Coats, 6 Cal App.
2d 743. '45 P2d 395 (1935); 58 Am. Jur. §62 "Work and Labor," p. 560.
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prima facie case by proving both the performance of
the work and the reasonable value of the work performed and materials supplied.
B.

Plaintiff's evidence failed to establish the
reasonable value of the materials and
labor provided.

Plaintiff indicated in opening remarks its intent
to call "Mr. Smith, an independent landscape architect who will testify about the reasonableness of the
charges which we [plaintiff} made." 10 Mr. Smith's
background and record includes the following:
1.

Employed as a landscape contractor for J.
& L. Garden Center in Centerville, Utah for
14 years.

2.

Contracts landscape work and does competitive bidding.

3.

Visited the restaurant site approximately
three weeks before trial - that date being
almost one year after the work had been
performed at a time when considerable
annual plants had been replaced and
which were not part of plaintiff's landscaping.

What followed in the form of proffered testimony
by Mr. Smith as an "expert" witness concerning the
"reasonable value" of the materials supplied and
work performed is nothing more than dialogue of evasive, ambiguous and uncertain statements and re1

or rial Transcript.

page 3, lines 7-9.

8

sponses. It is not defendant's contention that Mr.
Smith's testimony was erroneous or ill-founded. We
do not contend that what he said was not true. It is
what Mr. Smith did NOT say that concerns us and has
legal significance. Thorough examination of the very
brief testimony of this, the only independent witness
who testified or who was called to testify on plaintiff's
behalf concerning the reasonable value of the work
and labor performed, indicates that he NEVER DID
IN FACT SO TESTIFY in that regard nor tell the court
the reasonable value of said work and materials.
Mr. Smith immediately evidenced his scarce
familiarity with the problem at hand and also foretold
his own ignorance of any detail concerning the work
when plaintiff's counsel asked him if he had an opportunity to "survey", implying more than a casual
observation, the subject premises. 11 Mr. Smith replied that he had made only a "visual observation on
the site" and had "reviewed a little bit the plans." 12
When asked if the work on the plan (plaintiff's Exhibit "A") was actually done, his response was "As
near as I could tell." Mr. Smith was, however, unable
to follow plaintiff's counsel's lead concerning "additional work" and testified that he was not "aware that
there was any extras." 13 When asked about specific
items and the total bill, moreover, it became apparent
that Mr. Smith did not know if all the work on the plan
had, in fact, been completed.
1l

/d. page 8, lines 1-2.

12/d. page 8, lines 3-6.
13/d. page 11, lines 9-13.

9

0.

You don't know whether all of the plants
listed on the plan were actually planted on
the premises?

A.

No, that was not my purpose . . . . ' 4

And later:
0.

There may be some work drawn on the
plan that was not in fact done?

A.

That's very possible. 15

Plaintiff's summary of charges which it attempts
to collect from defendant and as enumerated on plaintiff's Exhibit "B" page 2, item 3 and Exhibit "F" invoice No. 40038 shows a total charge for tractor and
hand grading at $181.25. Plaintiff's counsel tried to
get Mr. Smith's opinion as to the reasonableness of
that charge, but Mr. Smith denied comment thereon
since he could not determine how much work was
16
actually done.
Plaintiff's summary also indicates a rather substantial charge in the sum of $1, 183.65 for "fences".
But in response to inquiry into what factors were taken
into consideration in valuing the labor and materials
comprising the fence work, Mr. Smith confessed that
he had no background in fence work and acknowledged that he did not even attempt to value that work
His statement was: "We did not figure the fence, I
14/d. page 13, lines 26-30.
15/d. page 17, lines 13-15.
16/d. page 8, lines 22-28.
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presume it is part of it, but it had nothing to do with
the part I was figuring." 17
Again, plaintiff's bill attempts to impose a charge
of $1,096 for combined cement work. (Items 4 and 9
of Exhibit "B" page 2 or Exhibit "F" invoice No. 40038)
With regard to this labor and material, Mr. Smith did
not know that a large part of the total bill involved cement work, 18 did not do cement work in his business, 19 did not know whether the general contractor
who built the restaurant or the plaintiff who did the
landscaping put in the concrete 20 , and as far as Mr.
Smith was concerned, it was not his responsibility to
compute whether the price charged was reasonable
in light of the cubic yards of cement work actually
done. 21 Hence, on four specific items (grading work
- $181.25; wishing well - one of the contract "extras" which Mr. Smith was "not aware of", $150.00;
fencing - $1, 183.65; and concrete - $1,096.00)
totalling $2,610.90 or roughly 40% of the total
$6,669.53 charge submitted by plaintiff, Mr. Smith was
entirely unable or unwilling to testify concerning their
reasonable value.
On the other items where, with some stretch of
the imagination, it could be said Mr. Smith by implication testified as to the reasonable value of materials

page
page
1 9/d. page
201d. page
211d. page
1 7 fd.

1 Bfd.

15,
16,
16,
16,
17,

line 30 through page 16, line 1.
lines 14-16.
lines 11-12.
lines 22-24.
line 5.
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furnished, he also admitted that prices on several
items vary according to their quality and that he did
not know what specific grades of materials were actually used. 22
What Mr. Smith did say concerning the prices
and charges sought to be imposed by plaintiff is so
ambiguous as to be wholly meaningless. Indeed,
plaintiff's counsel tried to elicit a clear and concise
statement as to the value of the items listed - he
tenaciously pursued Mr. Smith trying to extract one
firm commitment, one straight-forward response to
the real issue - "What is the dollar value of the materials and labor supplied by the plaintiff?" - but, alas,
the task proved too arduous! Plaintiff's counsel first
tried to lead softly into a commitment:
Q.

And in your review of the site, and the plan
and the costs, did you find any discrepancies?

A.

I didn't have any detail enough to determine whether there was so many square
23
feet involved or anything like that.

Plaintiff's counsel becomes more specific:
Q.

221d.
23/d.

Specifically with respect to Piccadilly and
that job, were there any items that you
could see on the job or on the plan which
would have required any unusual amounts
as far as square footage is concerned?

page 14, lines 17-19; page 18, lines 19-20.
page 10, lines 11-14.
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But the response is again negative:
A.

I don't know, I couldn't give you any definite word. 24

Undaunted, plaintiff's counsel tries again:
0.

Did you find that the bid and the work the bid that was made and the work which
was done were in line?

The "expert" replies:
A.

I had no way of determining this. 25

Plaintiff's counsel decides to give it one last try. He
begins to ask if the total bill is reasonable only to find
out that the appraiser-witness does not even know
what the total or final price was. 26
In summary, what Mr. Smith did say is of little
legal significance except as it indicates what he did
not say. One searches his testimony in vain for any
concrete evidence of the reasonable value of the material and labor in question.
The only other two witnesses who testified on behalf of the plaintiff were Mr. Del Cook, one of plaintiff's former employees who was directly responsible
for negotiating the original agreement, supervising the
work and preparing the final bill, and Mr. LeGrand
Grassli, Mr. Cook's immediate supervisor, who had
page 1O, lines 24-29.
2s1d. page 11, lines 23-25.
26/d. page 12, lines 1-6.
24/d.

13

only minimal and for the most part secondhand knowledge of the facts surrounding the case. Neither Mr.
Cook nor Mr. Grassli addressed the issue of reasonableness of the trial figure set forth in the plaintiff's bill
to defendant. But since the final bill is the only figure
offered to the court as the reasonable value of the
labor and materials furnished, we will consider the
propriety and legal significance of said bill in establishing a prima facie case for recovery in quantum
meruit. In preparation for trial of this matter and in
an effort to "explain and detail exactly what was done
in this case", Mr. Cook compiled the data shown on
plaintiff's Exhibits "B", "E" and "F", the former two
exhibits containing additions and deletions from the
original bid and the latter being the final bill. Examination of said exhibits reveal that they are replete with
contradictions, miscalculations, inconsistencies and
error. When the items on the exhibits were listed and ,
compared side by side on a blackboard during cross
examination, these inconsistencies became apparent.27 Mr. Cook, who prepared the exhibits, repeatedly acknowledged the inaccuracies of his own work
product.
Q.

Okay. Now the difference between
$696.80 and $1,345.50 is roughly $648.00,
and yet you only subtracted from the planting labor on Exhibit "E" $430.00.

A.

I would have to sit down and go through it
like you did before I told you why or
how. 28

27/d. pages 54-67.
28/d. page 59, lines 23-27.

14

1

A.

There is a discrepancy. There again,
don't know why or how. 39

0.

. I can't subtract $183.00 from
$1, 193.00 and get $800 in fencing.

A.

I see what you mean. 30

A.

Right. Again, I would have to check the
figures to find out why. 31

0.

But, Mr. Cook, your figures just don't jibe.

A.

Again, this is what I don't understand, and
I would have to, like I say, go through it. 32

But assuming, arguendo, the inconsistencies
could be reconciled, the fact remains that the only
figures placed in evidence are those found on plaintiff's bill or demand submitted to defendant. The legal
significance of the bill is not a difficult issue and can
be disposed of summarily.
The general rule of law is set forth in the case of
Wysowatchy v. Lyons 33 in which Iola Lyons filed a
claim against the estate of Maude Lee, deceased, for
services rendered to the decedent during her lifetime.
29 /d.

page
JO/d. page
31
/d. page
32 /d. page
33 328 P2d

62, lines 11-12.
62, lines 24-26.
63, lines 7-8.
63, lines 29-30 through page 64, line 1.
576 (Colo. 1958).
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No witnesses testified as to the value of the services
rendered by the claimant. The Colorado Supreme
Court, in reversing a lower court decision allowing the
claim, by citing an earlier decision held:
The evidence offered to show the quality and
the amount of service was meager, indefinite
and unsatisfactory. Not a vestige of evidence
was introduced to establish the worth of that ,
service, whatever it may have been. In the total
absence of such testimony no part of the claim
can properly be allowed.

The claim on file has no evidentiary value and
is merely the statement of a demand made
against an estate to be proved in the same
manner and by like evidence as would be required in other cases where one defends as an
administrator. Accepting allegations of the
claim as proof is to allow the claimant to prove
her demand by her own pleading. 34

34328 P2d at 576-77.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff elected to proceed in this matter under
a theory of quantum meruit which imposes upon plaintiff the burden of proving the performance of the work
and the reasonable value thereof. Plaintiff failed to
meet that burden of proof and defendant's motion for
summary judgment, made at the conclusion of plaintiff's case, should have been granted. The case
should be remanded to the District Court with instructions that the judgment be set aside and that defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted with
costs to the defendant-appellant.
Respectfully submitted,

STRONG, POELMAN & FOX

By)~.4:L~
HAROLD A. HINTZE
Attorney for Appellant
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